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FROZEN EMBRYOS: A NEED FOR




ENNESSEE Williams wrote that "life is an unanswered question, but
let's believe in the dignity and importance of the question."' Life, or
more specifically the beginning of life, is a question that has both
galvanized and polarized the United States over the last 20 years. The most
heated debate and discussion regarding the actual moment that life begins
has taken place in the abortion context. Recent advances in medical tech-
nology, however, have shifted the debate to areas of non-coital reproduction
with dramatic consequences on the participants in these procedures.
In vitro fertilization (IVF), 2 is a relatively new medical process that allows
infertile couples to conceive their own offspring.3 The first birth conceived
through IVF was achieved in Great Britain in 1978.4 Three years later, in
December of 1981, the first United States IVF baby was born. 5 Since that
time, the American legal system has been struggling to address the legal and
ethical implications of IVF.6
Initial success rates of IVF were low, and its availability was confined to a
limited geographic area.7 Today, however, with the aid of a new technique
1. TENNESSEE WILLIAMS, WORD POWER 325 (1981).
2. In vitro fertilization is an infertility treatment that involves obtaining mature human
ovum, fertilizing them with human sperm in a laboratory container, and then transferring the
embryos back into the woman's uterus. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, IN-
FERTILITY: MEDICAL AND SOCIAL CHOICES 123, 123 (1988); see infra notes 21-30 and accom-
panying text.
3. Although the origins of embryo transfer date back to 1890, when Walter Heape per-
formed the first transfer with rabbit embryos, this process was not successfully applied to
humans until late in the 1970's. Angela Marmaduke & Shirley Bell, In Vitro Fertilization and
Embryo Transfer Dilemmas, NURSING FORUM, Mar.-Apr. 1989, at 24.
4. Richard P. Dickey, Medical Status of the Embryo, 32 Loy. L. REV. 317, 317 (1986).
Louise Brown, the first IVF baby, was born on July 28, 1978, in Lancashire England. Id. For
a parent's perspective, see L. BROWN & J. BROWN, OUR MIRACLE CHILD CALLED LOUISE, A
PARENT'S STORY (1979).
5. See Jones et al., The Program for In Vitro Fertilization at Norfolk, 38 FERTILITY AND
STERILITY 14 (1982).
6. See David G. Dickman, Comment, Social Values in a Brave New World: Toward a
Public Policy Regarding Embryo Status and In Vitro Fertilization, 29 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 817
(1985).
7. See Dickey, supra note 4, at 323 (explaining that only 38 out of 108 in vitro fertiliza-
tion clinics existing in the United States in March of 1985 had achieved a pregnancy, with only
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called cryopreservation,8 thousands of babies have been born using IVF.9
As the use of IVF increases, the debate on the advantages and disadvan-
tages of the process intensifies. The benefits of IVF are numerous. In addi-
tion to helping infertile couples conceive, IVF has helped the scientific
community acquire a better understanding of reproductive biology. ° Fur-
ther, the process has been instrumental in improving both prenatal and post-
natal care." I
Not surprisingly, however, the advent of IVF and cryopreservation have
raised many troubling legal, medical, and ethical issues.12 Because these
processes allow the embryo to survive outside the womb, situations such as
death, divorce, or disagreement between couples raise difficult and complex
questions regarding the eventual disposition of the in vitro embryo.13 Of
course, clinics, doctors, and IVF participants may not always agree as to the
best course of action. 14 In fact, embryo disposition disputes are not only
possible, but should be expected. 15 At the center of this controversy is what
legal status, if any, is possessed by a frozen embryo. A secondary issue is the
determination of the rights each party has relative to the other in the event
of a disagreement. Many of these issues have found their way into the court
system in the cases of Davis v. Davis,16 York v. Jones, 17 and Del Zio v. Co-
26 achieving a live birth); IVF A Game for Losers at Half of the United States Clinics, MED.
TRIB., July 3, 1985, at 1.
8. Cryopreservation, in the context of this Comment, is the process by which embryos
are frozen for an indefinite period of time in order to save them for future use. See
Marmaduke & Bell, supra note 3, at 26. Cryopreservation is generally defined as the "preser-
vation of biological materials, such as tissue, sperm, fluids, blood or plasma at very low tem-
peratures... enabling the tissue to be used in another individual at a later time, as it remains
viable after thawing. The technique is also used to preserve semen for artificial insemination."
TABER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 435 (16th ed. 1989).
9. Medical Research International et al., In Vitro Fertilization - Embryo Transfer in the
United States: 1989 Results from the IVF-ET Registry, 55 FERTILITY AND STERILITY 14, 16
(1991). In 1989, there were 2876 American births resulting from the IVF process. Id.
10. See Barbara Gregoratos, Note, Tempest in the Laboratory: Medical Research on Spare
Embryos from In Vitro Fertilization, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 977, 977 (1986) (explaining that re-
search resulting from IVF has been extremely valuable in many medical contexts, including
biology).
11. Id.
12. See Knoppers & LeBris, Recent Advances in Medically Assisted Conception: Legal,
Ethical and Social Issues, 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 329 (1991). "More than a decade after the birth
of Louise Brown and after 12,000 other bii'ths by in vitro fertilization, over 100 reports of
special commissions worldwide exist on the ethical and legal issues." Id.; see also Thomas
Shannon, Ethical Issues Involved with In Vitro Fertilization, J. ASS'N OPERATING ROOM
NURSES (hereinafter AORN), Sept. 1990, at 627 (discussing the ethics of in vitro fertilization).
13. An embryo is the stage of prenatal development of a mammal occurring between the
ovum and the fetus. TABER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 576 (16th ed. 1989). In
vitro means in glass, as in a laboratory container. Id. at 939.
14. As discussed below, even if all the participants do agree on a course of action, a court
may still set aside the agreement under an "embryo as person" theory. See infra note 173 and
accompanying text.
15. Each year, the number of couples participating in IVF programs increases. Edward
Fugger, Clinical Status of Human Embryo Cryopreservation in the United States ofAmerica, 52
FERTILITY AND STERILITY 986, 989 (1989).
16. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1259 (1993).
17. 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
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lumbia Presbyterian Medical Center.1 s In-each of these cases, courts were
forced to decide what rights, if any, clinics, doctors, embryos, and IVF par-
ticipants have in disputes regarding the disposition of frozen embryos. Un-
fortunately, the courts could only look to medical and legal commentary for
guidance because the federal and state legislatures have been silent on these
matters.
Because of the lack of guidance from either state or federal governments,
participants in IVF programs frequently enter into agreements without any
certainty of whether these agreements regarding embryo disposition will be
enforced in court in the event of litigation. 19 Unanswered basic questions
that remain for future courts to struggle with include: (1) whether embryo
disposition agreements are enforceable; (2) whether and under what circum-
stances these agreements may be modified; and (3) whether an agreement
between parties may be implied merely by their participation in the IVF
process. 20
This Comment maintains that there is a need for federal legislation and
regulation regarding IVF disputes. Without more exact legislative guidance,
the judiciary is unable to effectively and fairly respond to the disputes that
have and will occur. Part I of this Comment discusses IVF and cry-
opreservation techniques. Part II reviews the current legal status of the em-
bryo and the resulting status of the other IVF parties, including various
attempts by the judiciary to resolve embryo disputes. Part III explores em-
bryo disposition agreements and the effect that judicial enforcement of these
agreements has had on embryo disputes. Part IV examines the ways in
which other countries have attempted to handle these problems. Finally,
Part V suggests that the federal government should draft legislation and reg-
ulations to give the participants a level of certainty that is not currently
present.
I. IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND CRYOPRESERVATION
A. IN VITRO FERTILIZATION
The IVF process gives an infertile couple the chance to conceive their own
biological child.21 To participate in an IVF program, however, a couple
must meet certain requirements. For example, a threshold requirement for
participation is that the couple possess the type of infertility problem that
the IVF process is designed to treat.22 Generally, IVF may be used when
infertility has resulted from tubal factors, mucas abnormalities, immunity to
spermatozoa, or male dysfunctions.23 Once a couple has met the general
18. No. 74-3558, slip. op. (S.D.N.Y. Nov 14, 1978).
19. See infra notes 202-07 and accompanying text.
20. See Dan Fabricant, Note, International Law Revisited: Davis v. Davis and the Need
for Coherent Policy on the Status of the Embryo, 6 CONN. J. INT'L. L. 173 (1990).
21. Infertility is defined as the failure to achieve conception after one year of unprotected
sexual intercourse. SALLY OLDS ET AL., MATERNAL-NEWBORN NURSING, A FAMILY CEN-
TERED APPROACH 108 (4th ed. 1992).




criteria for inclusion, they will usually undergo further screening to deter-
mine their suitability for the program.24
Once accepted into an IVF program, the first step in the process is to
induce ovulation by treating the woman with fertility drugs.25 This will re-
sult in the production of an increased number of eggs, 26 sometimes referred
to as "superovulation."'2 7 The eggs are then surgically removed and taken
into a lab where they are fertilized with the prospective father's sperm.28
After fertilization, the eggs are transferred to the woman's uterus. 29 The
pregnancy will then proceed in much the same way as a coital pregnancy.
Clinical pregnancies result in 20-25% of the cases, 30 with successful deliv-
eries occurring in roughly 10% of these pregnancies. 31
B. CRYOPRESERVATION 3 2
Cryopreservation is the method by which embryos are frozen in order to
preserve them for future use. Cryopreservation generally involves the pack-
aging of the embryo culture, resulting from the IVF process, with cryopro-
tectants. 33 The culture is then placed in a plastic or glass container for
gradual freezing and eventual storage in liquid nitrogen.34 An embryo may
be cryopreserved at any developmental stage. 35 Most efforts, however, have
concentrated on four to eight cell embryos. 36 When the IVF patient is ready
for the embryo to be transferred to the uterus, thawing is induced by revers-
ing the process. 37 Approximately 50% of cryopreserved embryos survive
the freezing/thawing process. 38
Before cryopreservation was developed, the major limitation of IVF was
determining what to do with the excess embryos. 39 Since the embryos could
24. Zev Rosenwaks & Owen Davis, In Vitro Fertilization and Related Techniques, in
DANFORTH'S OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 821, 823-24 (6th ed. 1990). Although selection
criteria will vary from program to program, factors of age, medical history, current health and
psychological makeup are usually considered. Id.
25. OLDS ET AL., supra note 21, at 122.
26. Dickey, supra note 4, at 324.
27. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2295 (1981).
28. OLDS ET AL., supra note 21, at 122.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 118.
31. Id. at 122. For criticism of this low success rate, see Shannon, supra note 12, at 626,
who claims the major drawback of in vitro fertilization is that it does not work very well.
About one-half of the clinics in the United States have not had a live birth result from the
process. Id.
32. This explanation of cryopreservation is both brief and simple out of necessity. For an
excellent scientific and historical discussion of this process, see Alan Trounsan, Preservation of
Human Eggs and Embryos, 46 FERTILITY AND STERILITY 1 (1986).
33. Rosenwaks & Davis, supra note 24, at 836. "Cryoprotectants are agents that replace





38. Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, Ethical Considerations of the New
Reproductive Technologies, 53 FERTILITY AND STERILITY IS, 37S (Supp. 2 1990).
39. Rosenwaks & Davis, supra note 24, at 836.
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not be preserved, the only choices were to immediately transfer the embryos
to the woman's uterus, discard them, or a combination of both.40 Transfer
presented problems because it is usually limited to three to four embryos for
health and safety concerns.4 ' Therefore, to the extent that transfer was an
option, it was only available when the excess embryos were a small number.
Discarding the embryos also presented several problems. Initially, ethical
issues concerning the disposition of the embryos must be addressed.42 Aside
from moral concerns, however, discarding embryos forces the couple to go
through the entire IVF process again if the initial process fails to produce a
successful pregnancy. 43 Consequently, freezing excess embryos for future
use made the IVF process more efficient and easier on participating
couples.44
II. THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE EMBRYO
Although the importance of advances in IVF and cryopreservation cannot
be overstated, one of the immediate effects of these processes has been to
raise unprecedented legal issues. As a practical matter, the combination of
IVF and cryopreservation allows embryos to survive outside the womb.
Thus, among the questions raised is what independent rights, if any, are
possessed by the in vitro embryo. The answer to this question necessarily
affects the options available to clinics, doctors, and patients in possible dis-
positions of the embryos.
A. THE NEED FOR A DEFINITIVE STATUS
The security of transaction theory is a concept that invisibly guides most
contractual agreements.4 5 Essentially, this theory is the shared understand-
ing that certain agreements or promises bind the participating parties and
are legally enforceable. 46 If a breach of the agreement should occur, both
parties, relying on either statutory law, case law, or a combination of both,
have a reasonable expectation of how a court will decide their particular
40. Id.
41. Id.; see Marmaduke & Bell, supra note 3, at 25. "Increasing the number of embryos
transplanted from one to three markedly increased the pregnancy rate from 13% to 35%." Id
42. One's view on discarding embryos largely depends on whether the embryo is seen as a
life form, deserving protection, or, instead, as property similar to other bodily organs. See
infra notes 63-87 and accompanying text.
43. This repetition of the IVF process is especially difficult in light of the emotional and
psychological toll that the procedure takes on the IVF patients. See Christopher Newton et
al., Psychological Assessment and Follow Up after In Vitro Fertilization: Assessing the Impact of
Failure, 54 FERTILITY AND STERILITY 879 (1990).
44. But see Marmaduke & Bell, supra note 3, at 27. "Use of cryopreservation for personal
convenience, was certainly not part of the original purpose of IVF." Id.
45. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 18 (2d ed. 1990). Protecting the parties' ex-
pectations after an exchange of promises is justified because, otherwise, the promises would be
of little use. Id.
46. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Disputes Over Omission in Contracts, 68 COLUM. L. REV.
860, 860 (1968) (absent an overriding public policy concern, courts should enforce contracts in
accordance with the parties' expectations).
19931
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dispute.47 Ultimately, this security allows the parties to deal with each other
with a high degree of certainty.48
In the IVF context, however, doctors, patients, and clinics make agree-
ments with very little certainty as to their enforceability. 49 These agree-
ments, commonly referred to as "consent documents" or "embryo
disposition agreements," 50 ideally cover all possible uses and the disposition
of the embryos in the event of disagreement, dispute, divorce, or death.51 Of
course, the enforceability of such an agreement largely depends on what
rights, if any, will be accorded to the in vitro embryo. 52 Currently, however,
there is little positive law or consistent public policy regarding the legal sta-
tus of the embryo. 53
The absence of a well-defined legal status for the in vitro embryo creates
several problems. One of the dangers that has been noted is that it "may
leave too much room for private reproduction agendas."'54 Because there is
a high degree of uncertainty as to the proper treatment of these embryos,
both doctors and patients will most likely pursue their own particular objec-
tives. 55 Another problem is that in the absence of legal certainty or statutory
guidance, patients and doctors may be reluctant to participate in IVF pro-
grams. 56 Finally, and most importantly, parties that do participate in an
IVF program and subsequently litigate the disposition of in vitro embryos
may be at the mercy of whatever particular theory a judge chooses in deter-
mining the legal status of the embryo. 57 This lack of certainty is particularly
harsh in light of the already present emotional and psychological stress that
infertility causes.5 s
Patients participating in an IVF program are in an emotionally vulnerable
47. FARNSWORTH, supra note 45, at 18.
48. Id.
49. John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Status of
the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 939, 1033 (1986).
50. For a representative embryo disposition agreement, see Appendix A.
51. Evelyne Shuster, Seven Embryos in Search of Legitimacy, 53 FERTILITY AND STERIL-
rry 975, 977 (1990); see infra notes 157-70 and accompanying text. For an example of provi-
sions regarding the contingencies of death or divorce, see Appendix A, page 3.
52. John A. Robertson, Reproductive Technology and Reproductive Rights: In the Begin-
ning: The Legal Status of the Early Embryos, 76 VA. L. REV. 437, 452 (1990) ("At issue in
determining [the] legal status [of the embryos] are several questions relating to the focus and
scope of decisional authority over embryos.").
53. Robertson, supra note 49, at 1033.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1034. This is perceived as a problem if you believe that the benefits of IVF are
actually good for society. For a different perspective, see MAKING BABIES: THE TEST TUBE
& CHRISTIAN ETHICS (A. Nichols & T. Holgan eds. 1984); Studdard, The Morality of In Vitro
Fertilization, 5 HUM. LIFE REV. 41 (1979).
57. See infra notes 90-147 and accompanying text for a discussion of Davis v. Davis, 842
S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1259 (1993).
58. See Paul D. Mozley, Psychosomatic Factors in Infertility, in GYNECOLOGY AND OB-
STETRICS 1 (6th ed. 1992); Debra Milne, Couples Experiences with In Vitro Fertilization, JOUR-
NAL OF OBSTETRIC, GYNECOLOGIC AND NEONATAL NURSING (hereinafter JOGNN), Sept.-
Oct. 1988 at 347; Anne Hirsh & Steve Hirsh, The Effect of Infertility on Marriage and Self
Concept, JOGNN, Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 13.
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state.5 9 This lack of emotional stability results from both infertility and the
IVF procedure. The effect of infertility has been characterized as leaving the
patients with a feeling of loss.6° This feeling of loss, which includes the loss
of children, self-esteem, and social role, leaves the patient with feelings of
"anxiety, anger, alienation, guilt and depression. '61 At the same time, the
patient is also dealing with the emotions that result from the IVF procedure.
Although some of these emotions are gender specific, they generally include
fear, guilt, and helplessness. 62
B. THEORIES ON THE STATUS OF THE IN VITRO EMBRYO
Determining the legal status of the embryo is essential to solving the un-
certainty that now plagues the IVF process and participants. Because there
is no positive law on the legal status of the in vitro embryo, litigating parties
usually turn to one of the three established theories regarding embryo status:
(1) the embryo-as-person theory, (2) the embryo-as-property theory, and (3)
the embryo-deserves-special-respect theory.
1. Embryo-as-Person Theory
Under the embryo-as-person theory, embryos are human and, as such,
should be accorded the rights of all other humans. 63 This position is sup-
ported by three main arguments.64 First, supporters of this position argue
that the in vitro embryo is biologically alive and genetically unique. 65 This
argument is based on the fact that embryos "metabolize, respire and respond
to changes in the environment."'66 Second, embryo-as-person supporters
rely on the "continuum argument" to support their position.67 This argu-
ment suggests that in vitro embryos should be protected because of their
potential for birth. 68 Supporters add that upon formation of the embryo, it
will continue to develop as human life, and therefore no interference should
be allowed. 69 Finally, this theory is defended by claiming that because the
embryos are deliberately created, Roe v. Wade70 principles are inapplica-
59. Milne, supra note 58, at 347.
60. Christopher Newton et al., Psychological Assessment and Follow-Up After In Vitro
Fertilization: Assessing the Impact of Failure, 54 FERTILITY AND STERILITY 879, 879 (1990).
61. Id.
62. Milne, supra note 58, at 349.
63. Robertson, supra note 52, at 444; Robertson, supra note 49, at 971; see Davis v. Davis,
No. E-14496, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *30 (Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989) (trial court finds
that life begins at conception) rev'd, No. 180, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Sept. 13, 1990), aff'd on other grounds, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1259 (1993).
64. Dickman, supra note 6, at 830.
65. Id.
66. Id. (quoting Walters, Ethical Issues in Human In Vitro Fertilization and Research
Involving Early Human Embryos, ETHICS ADVISORY BOARD, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, APPENDIX: HEW SUPPORT OF RESEARCH INVOLV-
ING HUMAN IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYO TRANSFER (1979)).
67. Id. at 831.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
1993]
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ble.71 The rationale is that since in vitro embryos exist outside the womb
and are purposely created, right to privacy arguments of the IVF patients
must fail.72
The embryo-as-person theory has been criticized in several areas. Critics
maintain that although an embryo is genetically unique, 73 this uniqueness
does not give rise to a protectable interest.74 They argue that a cell lacks
"neuromuscular requirements for cognition and sentience and is not even
individual until after implantation and further development occur." 75 Crit-
ics, therefore, maintain that in vitro embryos lack the necessary require-
ments to be a legally protected entity.76 The final criticism of the embryo-as-
person theory is that the potential to become human does not mean that a
human already exists. 77 Professor John Robertson, professor of law at the
University of Texas, adds that if this were the case, "an acorn should be
treated as an actual, rather than a potential, oak tree."'78 Therefore, detrac-
tors of this theory conclude that the interests of in vitro embryos, whatever
they may be, are less than the competing interests of the IVF participants
and other parties.79
2. Embryo-as-Property Theory
A second theory regarding the legal status of embryos is that the in vitro
embryo is similar to property, much like any other corporeal human tissue.80
The arguments supporting this theory are essentially the same ones used to
criticize the embryo-as-person theory detailed above.81 Thus, supporters of
the embryo-as-property theory conclude that as long as the IVF participants
agree, no limitations should be placed on actions regarding embryos.82 This
theory, of course, is not without criticism. Primarily, detractors claim that
treating embryos as property fails to recognize the high value that society
places on life and symbols of life.83
71. Dickman, supra note 6, at 830.
72. Id.; The right to privacy allows a woman to terminate a pregnancy through abortion
without state interference as long as the fetus is not viable. Roe, 410 U.S. at 160; see also Davis,
1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *31, *32 (trial court finds right to privacy argument is without
merit in IVF context).
73. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
74. Robertson, supra note 52, at 445.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 445; see also Singer & Dawson, IVF Technology and the Argument From Poten-
tial, 17 PHIL. PUB. AFF. 87, 90 (1988) (arguing that IVF technology makes traditional under-
standings of "potential" incompatible); P. SINGER AND D. WELLS, MAKING BABIES: THE
NEW SCIENCE AND ETHICS OF CONCEPTION 71-75 (rev. ed. 1985) (criticizing the potentiality
argument).
78. Robertson, supra note 52, at 445.
79. Id.; see also Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1259
(1993); infra notes 126-45 and accompanying text (Tennessee Supreme Court finds that rights
of the IVF patients are superior to that of the in vitro embryo).
80. Robertson, supra note 49, at 972.
81. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
82. Robertson, supra note 49, at 973.
83. Kim Schaefer, Comment, In Vitro Fertilization, Frozen Embryos, and the Right to




The special respect theory accords the embryo a status somewhere be-
tween the two other theories. This theory, which has been adopted by the
American Fertility Society, states that:
The preembryo deserves greater respect than that accorded to human
tissue but not the respect accorded to actual persons. The preembryo is
due greater respect than other human tissue because of its symbolic
meaning to many people. Yet, it should not be treated as a person,
because it has not yet developed the features of personhood, is not yet
established as developmentally individual, and may never realize its bio-
logical potential. 84
Professor Robertson explains that because the embryo "has the potential
to be more, it operates as a powerful symbol or reminder of the unique gift of
human existence." 85 According to Robertson, it is this symbolism that sepa-
rates embryos from other bodily tissue and causes it to deserve special con-
sideration even though it is not itself the right holder.
86
Obviously, however, special or qualified respect is not self defining. Treat-
ing an in vitro embryo with special respect will not have the same meaning
for all people.8 7 Additionally, it is a value-laden decision that may help from
a moral point of view, but is vague and offers no firm guidance in terms of
how doctors, patients, and clinics are to deal with the embryos in order to
legally protect themselves.
C. JUDICIAL APPLICATION IN DEFINING EMBRYO STATUS
As mentioned above, uncertainty regarding the status of the embryo cre-
ates many problems for IVF participants.8 8 Specifically, when litigation
over an embryo disposition ensues, the parties must rely on what appears to
be judicial subjectivity in regard to which embryo status theory will be ap-
plied to the case. To date, the only cases that have been brought to trial
graphically illustrate the need for consistent legislation and regulation re-
garding the legal status of the in vitro embryo.8 9
1. Davis v. Davis90
The dispute in Davis best represents the difficulty that the judicial system
has in assigning or determining the rights of the in vitro embryo. Factually,
the case involved a couple who divorced while participating in an IVF pro-
84. Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, supra note 38, at 355. Preem-
bryo is the term used by the Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society to denote an
embryo not more than 14 days old. Id. at vii.
85. Robertson, supra note 52, at 447.
86. Id. at 446.
87. Id. at 448.
88. See infra notes 184-215 and accompanying text.
89. The cases that follow are used for illustrative purposes. This analysis does not include
every case regarding these issues.
90. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1259 (1993).
1993]
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gran. 91 At issue was the determination of the proper disposition of the fro-
zen embryos upon divorce. Since no embryo disposition consent documents
had been signed, the focus was upon the rights of the various parties and not
the validity of any particular agreement. What resulted was essentially a
custody battle over the in vitro embryos between Junior Lewis Davis, the
sperm donor, and Mary Sue Davis, the ovum donor. Mr. Davis, claiming
the embryos were not life, asked the court to award himself and Mrs. Davis
joint custody of the embryos, or to prohibit Mrs. Davis or another from
using the embryos for implantation until they could agree upon their disposi-
tion. In the alternative, he asked the court to consider Mrs. Davis the only
suitable party for implantation. 92 Mrs. Davis asked that the court allow her
to utilize the embryos for herself.93
The outcome of the case necessarily turned on what rights, if any, are
accorded to the in vitro embryo. As mentioned above, the court, having no
statutory guidance, had three possible theories from which to consult and
choose: (1) embryo-as-person, (2) embryo-as-property, and (3) embryo-de-
serves-special-respect. 94 The application of each theory, under the facts of
this case, lead to different results. Incredibly, all three courts that heard the
case adopted a different theory regarding the legal rights of the embryos. 95
a. Davis v. Davis: Trial Court
At the trial court level, Circuit Judge W. Dale Young relied on the em-
bryo-as-person theory in deciding that granting custody to Mrs. Davis
would be in the embryo's best interests.96 The adoption of this theory forced
the court, in the context of a divorce action, to decide the legal status of a
human being as an in vitro embryo. Importantly, the court first noted that
neither Tennessee, nor any other state legislature, had enacted a law gov-
erning the case at bar.97 The trial court then went on to distinguish Roe v.
Wade and Webster v. Reproduction Health Services as applying exclusively to
91. The Davises participated in an IVF program at the Fertility Center of East Tennessee
in Knoxville under the direction of Dr. Irving Ray King, a specialist in gynecology and infer-
tility/reproductive endocrinology. In December of 1988, nine ovum were surgically removed
from Mrs. Davis and fertilized with Mr. Davis' sperm. Two of the ovum were implanted in
Mrs. Davis and the remaining seven were cryogenically preserved for future implantation.
The two implanted ovum did not result in a pregnancy.
92. Mr. Davis later argued that he would prefer to see the embryos destroyed before do-
nating them to another couple.
93. Mrs. Davis subsequently decided she no longer wanted the embryos but asked the
court for the authority to donate them to a childless couple.
94. See supra notes 63-87 and accompanying text.
95. Davis, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *30 (trial court finds that life begins at concep-
tion); Davis, No. 180, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642, at *25 (Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990) (court of
appeals adopts the embryo as property theory), aff'd on other grounds, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1259 (1993); Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 594-95 (state supreme court
adopts the embryos-deserve-special-respect theory).
96. Davis, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *30. ("The Court finds and concludes that
human life begins at the moment conception.") For criticism of Judge Young's reasoning, see
Shuster, supra note 51, at 975.
97. Davis, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *31.
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abortion situations.9" The court found that the right to privacy protections
afforded by these cases were inapplicable in the IVF context.99 Thus, the
trial court determined that there was no positive law or public policy that
would prohibit its development of case law in this particular area.100
In awarding custody of the in vitro embryos to Mrs. Davis, the court pri-
marily relied on the common law doctrine ofparenspatriae.1° 1 The focus of
this equitable doctrine is that the state should act in the best interest of the
child. Having concluded that the embryos were life, the trial court reasoned
that the parens patriae doctrine afforded the embryos specific protection. 102
Thus, Judge Young determined that it was in the best interest of the "chil-
dren, in vitro, that they may be made available for implantation to assure
their opportunity for live birth; implantation is their sole and only hope for
survival."10 3
Without question, this decision caught the attention of both the American
people and the rest of the western world. 14 Awarding Mrs. Davis custody
of the embryos raised several issues, such as (1) whether child support would
be required; (2) whether a judge could actually force parenthood on a male
IVF participant and, if so, whether parenthood could also be forced on a
female IVF participant; and (3) whether an embryo disposition agreement
would have had any bearing on the outcome of the case. Although each of
these issues are significant, they are merely symptoms of the underlying
problem, which is that, without legislative guidance, the judiciary is deciding
embryo disposition disputes by relying on personal philosophies. As Profes-
sor Robertson states:
Judge Young's conclusion that four-celled preimplantation human em-
bryos are "children" and "human beings" is unprecedented and unwar-
ranted. It has no discernable basis in common law precedents nor
Tennessee law (which recognizes a separate legal interest in prenatal
human life only at viability). It is a view rejected by highly respected
ethical advisory bodies in the United States, Great Britain, Canada,
France, and several other countries.
This remarkable conclusion appears to represent the judge's own per-
sonal view of the significance of the biologic fact that a new human
genome exists at or shortly after fertilization. 10 5
In spite of the volume of ethical opinions that are inapposite to this holding,
98. Id. at *31-*33.
99. Id. at *32-*33.
100. Id. at *33.
101. Id. at *34. Parens Patriae is the principle that the state must care for those who are
unable to care for themselves. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).
102. Davis, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *35.
103. Id. at *37.
104. See Steven Findlay et al., The Trial of an Embryonic Issue, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Aug. 21, 1989, at 13; James Lieber, The Case of the Frozen Embryos, SATURDAY EVE-
NING POST, Oct. 1989, at 66; Alain Sanders, Whose Lives Are These? A Judge Sets A Pro Life
Precedent For Frozen Embryos, TIME, Oct. 2, 1989, at 19; James Seligmann et al., Tempest in a
Test Tube, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 21, 1989, at 66.
105. John A. Robertson, Davis: An Unwarranted Conclusion, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Nov./Dec. 1989, at 11.
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Judge Young did receive expert testimony that, indeed, embryos were "early
human beings."' 06 Without statutes, regulations, or binding legal precedent
regarding these issues, however, perhaps Judge Young's opinion is more sub-
jective than unwarranted. A review by a higher court, which eventually es-
tablishes binding precedent, does not remove this element of personal
subjectivity. It is only through the legislative process that advisory boards,
scholars, and the general public have an efficient opportunity to be heard.
The political process, at least theoretically, will remove most of the influence
of individual subjectivity while still giving the parties involved in the IVF
process a necessary level of certainty in their agreements. Mr. Davis subse-
quently appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals of Tennessee. 0 7
b. Davis v. Davis: Court of Appeal of Tennessee
The court of appeals, in reversing the circuit court's decision, implicitly
adopted the embryo-as-property theory. 108 Initially, the intermediate court
found that the trial court's findings of fact and legal conclusions ignored
"the public policy implicit in the Tennessee statutes, the case holdings of the
Tennessee Supreme Court and the teachings of the United States Supreme
Court."'1 9 The court went on to add that it "would be repugnant and offen-
sive to constitutional principles to order Mary Sue [Mrs. Davis] to implant
these fertilized ova against her will."" 0 Therefore, the court reasoned, it
would be equally repugnant to force Mr. Davis to bear the burdens of un-
wanted paternity."'
Based upon its findings, the court of appeals held that both Mr. and Mrs.
Davis should share a joint interest in the seven frozen embryos. 12 The
court supported this conclusion with two Tennessee statutes, which respec-
tively regulate experimentation on aborted fetuses and codify the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act." 3 These statutes address the disposition of human
106. Davis, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *82. Dr. Jerome Lejeune, the geneticist who
provided this testimony, is best known for discovering the genetic cause of Down's Syndrome.
His testimony, although convincing to Judge Young, was refuted by several other experts in-
cluding Dr. Irving Ray King who stated that embryos do not begin to differentiate, and thus
become genetically unique, until after 14 days. Id. at *66. For criticism of Dr. Lejeunes testi-
mony, see George J. Annas, A French Homunculus in a Tennessee Court, 19 HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Nov./Dec. 1989, at 20.
107. Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642 (Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990), aff'd
on other grounds, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1259 (1993).
108. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 595.
109. Davis, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642, at *8.
110. Id. at *8-*9.
111. Id. at *9.
112. Id. The court of appeals was later criticized by the Tennessee Supreme Court for
failing to clarify specifically the nature of the interest. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 596.
113. Davis, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642, at *9. The court cited to TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 68-30-101 (1990), which codifies the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, and TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-15-208 (1990), which states:
Research, photography, sale, and experimentation upon aborted fetuses - Pen-
alty for violation(a) It is unlawful for any person, agency, corporation, partner-
ship or association to engage in medical experiments, research, or the taking of




organs and tissue, of either a particular donor or an aborted fetus, in what is
essentially a property context. 1 4 Additionally, the court cited to York v.
Jones,' 1  discussed below, which based its holding on an embryo-as-prop-
erty theory." 16
The practical effect of the court of appeal's decision and its adoption of the
embryo-as-property theory is to give one party automatic veto power over
the other. 1 7 Because, in the intermediate court's opinion, joint custody
means that both parties have an equal voice in the control of their embryos,
the party that wishes not to become a parent may object and prevent the
embryos from being transferred."18 Since the in vitro embryos cannot be
preserved indefinitely, a party's continued objection may ultimately lead to
the same result as discarding the embryos.' 19
The appellate court's decision was generally viewed as an improvement
over the trial court's holding.120 This is due in large part to the apparent
consensus that embryos are not children, and parties should not be made
parents against their will. 121 Unanswered questions, however, still re-
mained. For instance, the decision in favor of Mr. Davis necessarily inter-
fered with Mrs. Davis' rights to procreative liberty.122 Yet, the appellate
court did not explain why Mr. Davis' interest in avoiding procreation was
given priority over Mrs. Davis' interest in procreation. Would the party
wishing to avoid parenthood always prevail? If this is the case, what effect,
if any, would an embryo disposition agreement to the contrary have? There-
fore, while perhaps pleasing the general public, the decision offered little in
the way of providing certainty for current and future IVF participants. The
case was finally appealed to the Supreme Court of Tennessee. 123
c. Davis v. Davis: Supreme Court of Tennessee
Although the decision of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee was affirmed,
the Supreme Court of Tennessee found that allowing one party absolute veto
(b) No person, agency, corporation, partnership or association shall offer
money or anything of value for an aborted fetus; nor shall any person, agency,
corporation, partnership or association accept any money or anything of value
for an aborted fetus.
(c) It is the express intent of the general assembly that nothing in the provi-
sions of this section shall be construed to grant to a fetus any legal right not
possessed by such fetus prior to July 1, 1979.
(d) A violation of this section is punishable as a Class E felony.
114. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 595 (criticizing intermediate court's statutory reliance be-
cause it ignores the potential for life argument).
115. 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989); see infra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
116. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 595-96.
117. See id. at 598.
118. Davis, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642, at *9.
119. See Trounsan, supra note 32, at 10 (explaining that limitations exist as to the length of
time that embryos can remain in cryopreservation).
120. See John Robertson, Divorce and Disposition of Cryopreserved Pre-Embryos, 55 FER-
TILITY & STERILITY 681, 682 (1991) (stating that "[t]he appellate court's decision is a sound
resolution of the dispute in the Davis case").
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1259 (1993).
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power was "not the best route to take, under all circumstances."' 124 Instead,
the court felt that embryo disposition disputes should be resolved:
first, by looking to the preferences of the progenitors. If their wishes
cannot be ascertained, or if there is dispute, then their prior agreement
concerning disposition should be carried out. If no prior agreement ex-
ists, then the relative interests of parties in using or not using the preem-
bryos must be weighed.125
The court went on to state that it found "troublesome" the impression
that the intermediate court's holding left, that the IVF patients essentially
had property interests in the in vitro embryos.1 26 The supreme court con-
cluded that in vitro embryos were neither property nor persons, "but occupy
an interim category that entitles them to special respect because of their po-
tential for human life."' 27 This theory is the one adopted by the Ethics
Committee of the American Fertility Society. 128
Upon adopting the embryo-deserves-special-respect theory, the court dis-
missed its importance in resolving the dispute at bar. Concluding that the
outcome of the case turns on the parties exercise of their constitutional right
to privacy, the court stated:
Although an understanding of the legal status of preembryos is neces-
sary in order to determine the enforceability of agreements about their
disposition, asking whether or not they constitute "property" is not an
altogether helpful question . . . . [T]he essential dispute here is not
where or how long to store the preembryos, but whether the parties will
become parents.' 29
Further, the Tennessee Supreme Court, relying on Tennessee's abortion stat-
ute,130 reasoned that the state's interest in potential life was not sufficient "to
124. Id. at 598.
125. Id. at 604.
126. Id. at 596.
127. Id.
128. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
129. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 598.
130. The court cited to TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-201(c)(1)-(3) (1992), which provides
that:
(c) No person is guilty of a criminal abortion or an attempt to procure crimi-
nal miscarriage when an abortion or an attempt to procure a miscarriage is per-
formed under the following circumstances:
(1) During the first three (3) months of pregnancy, if the abortion or at-
tempt to procure a miscarriage is performed with the pregnant woman's consent
and pursuant to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending phy-
sician who is licensed or certified under title 63, chapter 6 or 9;
(2) After three (3) months, but before viability of the fetus, if the abortion or
attempt to procure a miscarriage is performed with the pregnant woman's con-
sent and in a hospital as defined in § 68-11-201, licensed by the state department
of health, or a hospital operated by the state of Tennessee or a branch of the
federal government, by the pregnant woman's attending physician, who is li-
censed or certified under title 63, chapter 6 or 9, pursuant to his medical judg-
ment; or
(3) During viability of the fetus, if the abortion or attempt to procure a mis-
carriage is performed with the pregnant woman's consent and by the pregnant
woman's attending physician, who is licensed or certified under title 63, chapter
6 or 9; and, if all the circumstances and provisions required for a lawful abortion
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justify an infringement on the gamete-providers' procreational auton-
omy. ' 131 The rationale, of course, is that if the state's interest is not suffi-
cient to prevent an abortion upon a fetus in the first trimester of pregnancy,
then it certainly is not sufficient to interfere in the embryo context.132
Upon dismissing the relevance of the in vitro embryo's status in determin-
ing the resolution of the case, the Supreme Court of Tennessee focused on
what it considered the real issue-the constitutional rights to privacy of Mr.
and Mrs. Davis. Initially, the court discussed the fact that although the
right to privacy is not explicitly mentioned in either of the constitutions of
the United States or the state of Tennessee, it was, nonetheless, a firmly em-
bedded concept.1 33 In support of its premise, the court noted that the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "no state
shall.., deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law." 134 Further, while the liberties guaranteed have not been defined
with any particular exactness, the court reasoned that, consistent with
United States Supreme Court case law, these liberties included fundamental
rights that were personal in nature.1 35 Additionally, the court noted that the
Tennessee Constitution places a strong emphasis on the concept of individ-
ual liberty.136
Second, the Tennessee Supreme Court concluded that the right to privacy
in Tennessee included an individual's right to procreate.1 37 Relying exclu-
sively on United States Supreme Court cases involving reproductive free-
dom, the court illustrated that procreational autonomy is considered a basic
concept of liberty.' 38 This procreational autonomy is composed of two
or lawful attempt to procure a miscarriage during the period set out in subdivi-
sion (c)(2) are adhered to; and if, prior to the abortion or attempt to procure a
miscarriage the physician shall have certified in writing to the hospital in which
the abortion or attempt to procure a miscarriage is to be performed, that in his
best medical judgment, after proper examination, review of history, and such
consultation as may be required by either the rules and regulations of the hospi-
tal licensing board promulgated pursuant to § 68-11-209, or the administration
of the hospital involved, or both, the abortion or attempt to procure a miscar-
riage is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother, and shall have filed
a copy of the certificate with the district attorney general of the judicial district
wherein the abortion or attempt to procure a miscarriage is to be performed.
131. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 602.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 598-99.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 599. The court relied on the United States Supreme Court cases of Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that liberty includes the freedom to contract,
engage in a chosen occupation, marry, bring up children and "generally enjoy those privileges
long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men")
and Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (holding that the concept of liberty
includes the right to be free of government interference).
136. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 599. The Davis court thought it was especially significant that
the Tennessee Constitution is the only constitution among the states that gives its citizens the
right, in Article I Section 2, to resist oppression and interference with liberty, even to the point
of overthrowing the government. Id.
137. Id. at 600.
138. Id. at 600-01; see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (holding that the right
to privacy necessarily includes the individual's right to decide, without government interfer-
SMU LAW REVIEW
equally significant parts-the right to procreate and the right to avoid pro-
creation.' 39 Of course, what remains is to determine which party's equally
significant right to privacy should prevail.
In the Tennessee Supreme Court's view, resolution of the case required
balancing the right to procreate against the right to avoid procreation. 140 In
balancing these rights, the court analyzed the individual burdens that would
be imposed on both Mr. and Mrs. Davis. Imposing unwanted parenthood on
Mr. Davis would have both financial and psychological effects. Specifically,
Mr. Davis testified that his parents had divorced when he was five years old
and that he had been placed in a boy's home. This, Mr. Davis testified, left
him suffering from "severe problems" as a result of the separation from his
parents. 141 In light of these experiences, Mr. Davis strongly opposed having
a child that would not live with both of its parents.
The court next analyzed the burden Mrs. Davis would bear if the in vitro
embryos were not transferred to another couple. The court concluded that
she would bear the emotional frustration of knowing that the extensive and
intrusive IVF procedures undertaken were futile and that the embryos she
helped create would not become children.142 The court decided in favor of
Mr. Davis, holding that his burden would be more significant than that of
Mrs. Davis.143 In dicta, however, the court indicated that the case would
have been closer if Mrs. Davis was intending to use the embryos herself. The
court suggested that her interests would still not prevail unless she had no
other reasonable opportunity to achieve parenthood. 144
The result of the supreme court's decision in Davis is certainly a step
forward in attempting to provide doctors, clinics, and IVF patients more
legal certainty. Many problems, however, still remain. Most importantly is
the extent to which parties may rely on the court's suggestion in dicta that
an embryo disposition agreement could have influenced the result of the liti-
gation. 1 45 Further, if embryo disposition agreements are enforceable in Ten-
nessee, questions persist as to whether they may be modified after execution.
Finally, it is not clear whether the court, under certain situations, would
imply an agreement between the IVF patients by virtue of their participation
in creating the embryos. Although the court did not imply a contract in
Davis, it is not clear that this would never be the case. Therefore, although
the Davis court did make it clear that the embryo-as-person theory is not the
law of Tennessee and that embryo disposition agreements will probably be
enforced, the need for legislative action is still necessary in order to provide a
coherent, consistent framework in which the IVF parties can operate.
ence, whether or not to bear a child); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (stating
that the right to procreate is "one of the basic rights of man").
139. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 603-04.






2. York v. Jones 146
York involved a dispute between the IVF patients and the IVF clinic re-
garding which party possessed control over the disposition of one frozen
embryo. While residing in New Jersey, a couple participated in an IVF pro-
gram in Virginia. The couple subsequently moved to California following
several unsuccessful implantation attempts. They asked the Virginia clinic
to transfer the remaining embryo to a clinic in California where the couple
would have it implanted. The Virginia clinic refused, however, claiming that
transferring the embryo was not an option under the Cryopreservation Dis-
position Agreement.1 47 The Yorks brought suit in federal court for unlawful
retention, breach of contract, quasi-contract, detinue, and violation of fed-
eral civil rights. The defendant clinic responded by filing a 12(b)(6) motion,
claiming that the case should be dismissed because the Yorks had failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The York court, which denied the clinic's motion to dismiss, implicitly
adopted the embryo-as-property theory. In its analysis, the court determined
that the cryopreservation agreement created a bailor-bailee relationship be-
tween the parties. 14 8 As such, the relationship imposed an obligation on the
clinic to "return the property" when the purpose of the bailment had termi-
nated. 149 Thus, consistent with the embryo-as-property theory, the York
court decided the motion based on the terms of the contract and the applica-
tion of property law. 150 In fact, the court assumed that the parties had prop-
erty rights in the embryos and never actually discussed any other
possibilities. The case eventually settled, however, so the extent to which
IVF participants can rely on the embryo-as-property theory remains
uncertain.
3. Del Zio v. Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center1 5 1
The Del Zio case was the first judicial decision involving the application of
IVF. 15 2 Mrs. Del Zio, who had medical problems with her fallopian tubes,
was unable to carry a successful pregnancy. After surgery failed to cure the
infertility problem, the Del Zios' physician, a staff doctor at Columbia Pres-
byterian Medical Center, suggested that the couple try the new procedure of
IVF. At that time, there had been no successful implantations of an in vitro
embryo. After the Del Zios agreed, an ovum from Mrs. Del Zio was re-
146. 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
147. The Cryopreservation Disposition Agreement provided that should the couple no
longer wish to attempt to initiate pregnancy, they could either 1) donate the embryos to an-
other infertile couple; 2) donate the embryos for approved research investigation; or 3) have
the embryos thawed but not allowed to undergo further development.
148. Id. at 425.
149. Id. (emphasis added).
150. See Robertson, supra note 52, at 463.
151. No. 74-3558, slip-op. (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1978).
152. See Lori Andrews, The Legal Status of the Embryo, 32 LoY. L. REV. 357, 367 (1986)




moved and placed in a laboratory container, Mr. Del Zio's sperm was added,
and the culture was placed into an incubator.
The Del Zios' cause of action arose when Dr. Raymond Vande Wiele, a
hospital supervisor and chairman of the department in which the culture
was housed, learned that a staff doctor was conducting an unauthorized IVF
procedure. Dr. Vande Wiele felt that more research should be done before
conducting the IVF procedure on humans and that, in any event, the hospi-
tal's permission should have been procured before conducting the proce-
dure. 153 Dr. Vande Wiele, without consulting either the Del Zios or the staff
physician involved, deliberately destroyed the culture by placing it in a
freezer in his office. 154 Subsequently, the Del Zios filed suit for the deliberate
destruction of a possible embryo. 155
At trial, the Del Zios maintained that they had suffered intentional inflic-
tion of severe emotional distress and tortious conversion of personal prop-
erty. 156 After a lengthy trial and jury deliberation, the jury rejected the
plaintiff's property damage claim but awarded the Del Zios $50,000.00 in
damages for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Thus, in the Del
Zio case, the court specifically rejected the embryo-as-property theory.
The rejection of the embryo-as-property theory casts doubt upon the po-
tential enforceability of an embryo disposition agreement. Given that the
jury was willing to accept that the Del Zios had become emotionally at-
tached to the embryos as potential human life rather than property, one is
left to wonder as to whether this potential life has rights of its own. It seems
to follow that if embryos are not personal property, then doctors and IVF
patients have limited authority and control over the disposition of the em-
bryos. Again, this uncertainty illustrates the major problem that plagues the
IVF process in the United States.
III. THE EMBRYO DISPOSITION AGREEMENT 157
Some commentators have suggested that judicial enforcement of embryo
disposition agreements would resolve the uncertainty problems arising in the
IVF context.158 Embryo disposition agreements are essentially contracts be-
tween the IVF patients, doctors, and clinics that provide for the disposition
of any in vitro embryos in the event of specified contingencies. 159 Embryo
153. Id. at 367-68.
154. See Palm & Hirsch, Legal Implications of Artificial Conception: Making Babies Makes
Law, 1982 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 404, 421.
155. Although sperm had been placed in the laboratory container with the ova, fertilization
had not been confirmed at the time of destruction. See Tabitha Powledge, A Report From the
Del Zio Trial, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1978, at 15.
156. Palm & Hirsch, supra note 156, at 421.
157. For a representative embryo disposition agreement, see Appendix A.
158. See John A. Robertson, Prior Agreementsfor Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 51 OHIO
ST. L.J. 407, 414 (1990) (stating that courts should enforce embryo disposition agreements).
159. Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, supra note 38, at 60S; see also
Christi Ahnen, Comment, Disputes Over Frozen Embryos: Who Wins, Who Loses, and How Do
We Decide?- An Analysis of Davis v. Davis, York v. Jones, and State Statutes Affecting Repro-
ductive Choice, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1299, 1344 (1991).
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disposition agreements generally provide for the disposition of in vitro em-
bryos in the event of death, divorce, or dispute. 6°
The disposition agreement, which is normally executed before a patient
begins the IVF process, falls into one of two categories.1 6' The first category
has a provision that provides the couple an "advance directive option."'1 62
This type of agreement allows the IVF patients to decide the dispositional
fate of the in vitro embryos in advance of the specified event. The most
common directives are to donate the embryos to another couple, donate the
embryos to the scientific community for research, or to discard the em-
bryos. 163 The second category of embryo disposition agreements informs
the IVF patients of what will be done with the in vitro embryos should the
specified event occur. 64 For example, in the event of the death of one of the
patients, the clinic may automatically discard any remaining embryos or au-
tomatically donate them to another couple. At the heart of this type of
agreement is the concept of informed consent.' 65 Although the clinic deter-
mines the eventual disposition of the embryos should the specified event oc-
cur, the patients are presumably fully aware and informed of this fact and
have agreed to it in advance. The agreement will be legally binding, in a
manner similar to other medical procedures, only if the patient's consent is
voluntary, competent, and informed. 66 Ultimately, the distinction between
these two types of disposition agreements is that in the former, the contract
is essentially between the two IVF participants and, in the latter, the agree-
ment is between the IVF participants and the clinic.
If consistently enforced, embryo disposition agreements would solve many
of the uncertainty problems that now exist in the IVF context.' 67 Unfortu-
nately, the validity of embryo disposition agreements remains very much in
question.' 68 Professor Robertson points out that:
160. Robertson, supra note 160, at 410.
A recent survey of embryo cryopreservation in the United States... found that
twenty-three of the twenty-seven programs that reported offering embryo freez-
ing required the patient to designate the method of disposition of frozen em-
bryos in case of parental death or divorce. Of the centers that required a
disposition document, twenty-one centers included the option to donate the fro-
zen embryo to another couple, six included an option to use the embryos for




163. Id. For representative examples of these provisions, see Appendix A, pp. 3-4.
164. Robertson, supra note 160, at 410.
165. The doctrine of informed consent requires a physician to disclose all information ma-
terial to an individual's decision regarding whether to submit to a particular medical proce-
dure. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786-87 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972); see also Sharon Perley, Note, From Control Over One's Body to Control Over One's
Body Parts: Extending the Doctrine of Informed Consent, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 335, 338 (1992).
166. Cynthia Northrop, Nursing Research, in LEGAL ISSUES IN NURSING 333, 340 (1987).
Informed consent is defined as "[a] person's agreement to allow something to happen (such as
surgery) that is based on a full disclosure of facts needed to make the decision intelligently; i.e.,
knowledge of risks involved, alternatives, etc." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 779 (6th ed.
1990).
167. See infra notes 177-83 and accompanying text.
168. Robertson, supra note 160, at 410.
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Uncertainty about the legal status or enforceability of these agreements
is not surprising given the nascent state of embryo freezing. No state
has enacted legislation recognizing the validity of such agreements, nor
specified the conditions under which they must be made to be valid.
Their validity has been neither upheld nor denied in the courts, if only
because direct legal challenges have not arisen. 169
As alluded to in the cases discussed above,' 70 the enforceability of an em-
bryo disposition agreement largely depends on the legal status accorded to
the embryo. If there has been no legislative effort to either define embryo
rights or regulate embryo disposition agreements, the courts are free to
adopt the theory of their choice, causing tremendous legal uncertainty.
A. EFFECT OF EMBRYO STATUS THEORY ON ENFORCEABILITY OF
EMBRYO DISPOSITION CONTRACTS
Each of the three theories regarding embryo status have a different effect
on the possible enforceability of the disposition agreement. If a court adopts
the embryo-as-person theory, one can presume that the embryo disposition
agreement will either not be enforced or will be severely restricted.' 7' Be-
cause this theory assumes that the in vitro embryo has a constitutionally
protected interest, the parties would be limited to dispositional options that
preserve the embryo's best chance for life. Without question, under this the-
ory embryos could not be discarded or donated for scientific research. The
only available options would be for the IVF patient to either use the embryos
for herself or to donate them to another couple.
Conversely, adopting an embryo-as-property theory implies that embryo
disposition agreements are enforceable if they meet the other requirements of
contract law. ' 72 Under this theory, it may be concluded that there would be
few, if any, limitations on the disposition options available to the
participants.
Finally, and perhaps most difficult to predict, is the application of the
embryo-deserving-special-respect theory and its effect on disposition agree-
ments. In Davis 3 the Supreme Court of Tennessee, which explicitly
adopted this theory, stated in dicta that embryo disposition agreements
would be enforceable. Many scholars and ethical committees supporting the
theory also maintain that the theory does not preclude the enforceability of
embryo disposition agreements. 174
169. Id.
170. See supra notes 90-158 and accompanying text.
171. See Davis, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *30 (finding that life begins at conception,
arguably rendering embryo disposition agreements moot).
172. See York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 425 (E.D. Va. 1989) (applying contract analysis
and strictly enforcing the embryo disposition agreement as written).
173. 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1259 (1993).
174. See Robertson, supra note 52, at 472-73.
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B. ADVANTAGES OF JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF EMBRYO DISPOSITION
AGREEMENTS
There are numerous advantages to judicial enforcement of embryo dispo-
sition agreements. Primarily, judicial enforcement will allow the IVF par-
ticipants to contract with each other without fear that judicial intervention
will set aside their agreement. Other benefits, however, also result from in-
creased legal certainty in the IVF context. For instance, if embryo disposi-
tion agreements are enforceable, the IVF patients will be allowed to exercise
their procreative rights to the full extent.1 75 Another benefit of legal cer-
tainty is that it should increase the efficiency and convenience of the IVF
process.' 76 This would result because advance certainty prevents major
questions, such as how long embryos must be stored or the allowable dispo-
sition of embryos, from being decided on an ad hoc basis.' 77 Clinics, doc-
tors, and patients would know in advance which legal options are available
regarding the IVF process and that the agreements regarding these options
will be binding. Ultimately, this would prevent the IVF participants from
having to negotiate new agreements or await the outcome of costly litigation,
such as occurred in Davis.'78 A third benefit resulting from legal certainty is
that it would decrease both the costs and number of disputes regarding em-
bryo disposition. ' 9 Less litigation could be expected because a party is not
likely to argue for a disposition of embryos that is different from the one
agreed upon in advance.180 This rationale applies whether the potential dis-
pute is between the two IVF patients, as in Davis, or between the IVF pa-
tients and the clinic, as in York. Further, costs of dispute resolution should
decrease because courts could focus entirely upon the validity of the agree-
ment rather than the more complex issues of burden analysis and embryo
status. '
C. DISADVANTAGES OF JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF EMBRYO
DISPOSITION AGREEMENTS
In spite of the advantages resulting from judicial enforcement of embryo
disposition agreements, in the absence of legislative guidance, many
problems remain.
1. Modification
The first question is when and if, at all, an agreement can be modified once
175. Robertson, supra note 160, at 415. Maximization of procreative choice occurs in the
context of patient prior directive embryo disposition agreements. Id.; see supra notes 156-58
and accompanying text.
176. Robertson, supra note 160, at 415.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 417.
179. Id. at 418.
180. Id.
181. Id.; see also John A. Robertson, Resolving Disputes Over Frozen Embryos, 19 HAS-
TINGS CENTER REP., Nov./Dec. 1989, at 11 (enforcing embryo disposition agreements
reduces costs and frequency of disputes).
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the agreement has been signed by the IVF participants. The easy case, of
course, is when all parties agree to modification.18 2 Under these circum-
stances, the modification is really an agreement to make a new contract. 8 3
Therefore, if embryo disposition agreements are enforceable, agreed-upon
modifications should also be enforceable.
More difficult issues arise when one party wishes to change his or her
disposition directive and the other refuses to agree.' 84 This scenario can
arise in several contexts. For instance, the two IVF patients may disagree
or, alternatively, the IVF patients and the clinic may be in dispute. Further,
the party seeking to modify the agreement may be doing so either before or
after any contingency has occurred.
Some have argued that in the absence of agreement, modification should
not be allowed.' 8 5 The rationale of this conclusion is that the party not
agreeing to the modification relied on the other party's earlier promise.' 8 6
For example, in a situation where the IVF patients have agreed to discard
the embryos in the event of divorce, the party not consenting to a modifica-
tion may claim that he or she would not have agreed to the process if there
was a risk of having children in the event of divorce.' 8 7
Others, however, have argued that, even without the consent of the other
party, modification should be unilaterally allowed because of the profound
consequences of embryo transfer. 8 8 In these circumstances, the IVF patient
seeking modification should be able to prove that "changed circumstances
make enforcement of the agreement unreasonable."' 9 Without legislative
guidance, one may conclude that the judiciary would, on a case by case ba-
sis, determine what changes in circumstances make enforcement unreasona-
ble. As discussed below, these problems and others illustrate the need for
legislative bodies, and not the judiciary, to provide proper guidance in the
IVF context.
2. Adhesion
Another problem with judicial enforcement of embryo disposition agree-
182. See Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, supra note 38, at 60S. The
American Fertility Society's position is that IVF patients should be allowed to jointly change
or modify their disposition directives if the contingency has not occurred. Id.
183. See Farnsworth, supra note 45, at 301 (substituted contracts have the effect of replac-
ing the original obligations with the agreed upon new obligations).
184. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1259
(1993).
185. See Robertson, supra note 160, at 420 ("The risk of unfairness in enforcing embryo
agreements does not override the advantages of legal certainty that accrues to couples and IVF
programs from enforcing these agreements."); Ahnen, supra note 161, at 1350 ("If the gamete
providers disagree as to the form of disposition... modification cannot occur, and the terms of
the embryo disposition agreement should be enforced against the gamete providers.").
186. See Farnsworth, supra note 45, at 260 (detrimental reliance may serve as a basis for
enforcing contracts).
187. Robertson, supra note 160, at 420.
188. REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,





ments is the possibility of adhesion contracts. 19 This problem can occur in
two situations. The first arises when the clinic and doctors seek to limit or
control the IVF patient's choices regarding embryo disposition. 19 1 Assum-
ing that embryo disposition agreements are enforceable, these limitations
would also likely be enforceable as long as the doctors and clinics have a
legitimate interest in controlling the embryo disposition. 92 The primary ar-
gument in support of a clinic's or doctor's legitimate interest is that, as pri-
vate institutions, they have professional concerns regarding the handling of
the in vitro embryos and therefore need this type of control. 193 A legitimate
interest may also include the clinic's and doctor's moral philosophy.' 94 For
instance, some IVF programs with pro-life views may refuse to offer IVF
patients the option to discard the embryos.
Adhesion difficulties are possible in this context for several reasons. First
is the potential for doctors and clinics to exert so much control over IVF
programs that the patients have little or no choice in the embryo disposi-
tion. 195 The patient's freedom of choice may be further restricted by geo-
graphic constraints and the possibility of similar professional and moral
values in a particular region.' 96 Additionally, issues of unequal bargaining
power are especially prevalent in the IVF context because the patients rarely
have any detailed knowledge of the process and the procedure in comparison
to those that operate the IVF programs. This issue is further complicated by
the fact that the patients encounter IVF programs at a time when they are
experiencing a tremendous amount of psychological stress and emotional
trauma caused by infertility.19 7 These factors cause the possibility of adhe-
sion between the patients and the clinic to be a real concern.
Adhesion problems may also arise as a result of the relationship between
the two IVF patients. In cases involving the emotional or physical abuse of
one spouse over another, the abused spouse's consent may not actually be
voluntary. Even in less extreme cases, one spouse's domination in a relation-
ship may effectively limit or eliminate the other spouse's freedom of choice.
These concerns can and should be addressed with statutory regulation.
One possibility would be to require that extra protection be given to guaran-
tee that the IVF patient's consent was truly informed. 198 To be sure that the
patients are fully informed of their reproductive choices and the possible
consequences, a special consent counselor could be appointed to each couple
190. Adhesion contracts are a "[s]tandardized contract form offered ... on essentially a
take it or leave it basis. [The] distinctive feature of adhesion contract is that [the] weaker party
has no realistic choice as to its terms." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 40 (6th ed. 1990).
191. See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
192. Robertson, supra note 52, at 472.
193. Id. at 472.73.
194. Id. at 471; Ahnen, supra note 161, at 1354.
195. Robertson, supra note 183, at 11 (IVF programs may exert what is essentially monop-
oly control over the embryo disposition questions).
196. Ahnen, supra note 161, at 1354-55.
197. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
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to monitor and ensure their understanding.199 Another possibility includes
making seminars available that explain the variety of choices and where they
may be obtained. In any event, these possible solutions to the adhesion
problem can only be provided efficiently and fairly in legislative guidelines.
3. Validity
Another problem concerning the judicial enforcement of embryo disposi-
tion agreements is their similarity to other procreative rights agreements that
have been held invalid. Generally, contracts regarding adoption, abortion,
and surrogate motherhood are unenforceable. 20 0 This doctrine was best il-
lustrated in the New Jersey Supreme Court case of In re Baby M. 20 1
Baby M involved the legality of a surrogacy contract. The purpose of a
surrogacy contract is to provide an infertile couple with a baby through the
artificial insemination of an unrelated third party female. In Baby M the
third party female was paid a fee of $10,000.00 and, in turn, was expected to
conceive, carry the baby to term, and thereafter relinquish the child to the
infertile couple. The contract also provided that the surrogate mother would
be separated from the child upon birth and would not make future contact.
The New Jersey Supreme Court held surrogacy contracts invalid because
they conflict with both public policies and state statutes.20 2 Therefore, sur-
rogate mothers cannot contractually give up rearing rights and other duties
of child rearing, at least at the prenatal or preconception stage.20 3 This ra-
tionale has also been applied to abortion situations.
Through analogy, one might argue that embryo disposition agreements
are similar enough to surrogacy contracts to violate public policies of certain
states. After all, if surrogacy contracts are invalid because of the prenatal
attempt to relinquish parental rights, why should embryo disposition agree-
ments be treated any differently? Those who support the enforcement of
these agreements answer this question by relying on one major distinction
between the embryo disposition agreements and those that are similar to
surrogacy contracts. That is, in surrogacy contracts, the woman is being
asked to adhere to an agreement made before undergoing the physical and
emotional factors of pregnancy. 2° 4 It is argued, therefore, that the law rec-
ognizes the bonding and emotional relationship that can occur between a
pregnant woman and her fetus. 20 5 In the IVF context, however, this is not
necessarily the case. For instance, seeking to enforce an agreement against a
female IVF patient that provides for discarding in vitro embryos is distin-
guishable from the surrogacy situation because, arguably, the IVF patient
199. Robertson, supra note 52, at 465 n.73.
200. Robertson, supra note 183, at 11; Robertson, supra note 160, at 421; Robertson, supra
note 52, at 465.
201. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
202. Id. at 1240.





has not experienced the same physical and emotional attachment that occurs
in pregnancy. Thus, one may conclude these agreements are enforceable.
4. Implied Agreements
A final problem resulting from the judicial enforcement of embryo disposi-
tion agreements is whether an agreement between parties to reproduce may
be implied merely through their participation in an IVF program.20 6 One
certainly could conclude that if express embryo disposition agreements are
legally enforceable under a contract theory of law, implied agreements
should also be enforceable. 20 7 The premise is further supported by the ob-
servation that the purpose of IVF is to give infertile couples an opportunity
to reproduce. Thus, a court may reasonably conclude that a party's partici-
pation in the TVF process illustrates that party's intent to have a child. 20
Other factors such as physical, financial, and emotional investment may also
illustrate the party's intent to carry out the IVF process. 20 9
There are those, of course, who argue that a party's participation in the
IVF process should not be used as a basis for implying that an agreement to
reproduce exists. 210 Professor Robertson points out that, "because so many
contingencies could intervene, . . . creation of embryos alone should not be
taken as an irrevocable commitment to reproduction. ' 21 1 For example, situ-
ations such as death, divorce, or illness could change a couple's circum-
stances so dramatically that their intentions regarding the in vitro embryos
could change. Further, in the absence of an express agreement, there is no
reason to believe that the couple considered these issues and decided that,
should the contingency occur, they would continue with the IVF process. 212
Thus, it is argued that participation in the IVF process, without an express
embryo disposition agreement, only illustrates the party's intention to create
embryos. The decision of whether these embryos should be transferred, and
when, is one that occurs later.213
Therefore, while consistent judicial enforcement of embryo disposition
agreements would provide a level of legal certainty that is not currently pres-
ent in the IVF process, many serious problems would remain. Questions of
modification, adhesion, validity, and reliance are a few of the issues that IVF
participants would still face. As discussed below, this Comment maintains
that the judiciary, at best, could provide only an ad hoc approach to defining
and solving these issues. At worst, inconsistent and subjective resolution
206. See Farnsworth, supra note 45, at 135 (contract that results from parties conduct is
"implied in fact").
207. See Ahnen, supra note 161, at 1350; Mario Trespalacios, Comment, Frozen Embryos:
Towards an Equitable Solution, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 803, 828 (1992).
208. Trespalacios, supra note 209, at 828.
209. Id. at 829; Andrea Bonnicksen, Embryo Freezing: Ethical Issues in the Clinical Setting,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1988 at 26.
210. See Robertson, supra note 52, at 475 n. 93.
211. Id. at 475.




would leave the IVF participants in no better situation than before judicial
enforcement of embryo disposition agreements.
IV. OTHER COUNTRIES AND THEIR SOLUTIONS
The United States is not alone in dealing with the ethical and legal issues
resulting from IVF and cryopreservation. In fact, much of the research and
development regarding these techniques has occurred outside the United
States.214 For this reason, it is worth considering the paths taken by Austra-
lia and the United Kingdom.
A. AUSTRALIA
In 1982, the government of the state of Victoria, Australia established a
committee (the Waller Committee)215 to consider the "social, ethical and
legal issues arising from in vitro fertilization." In large part, the Waller
Committee was established to attempt to resolve the much publicized Rios
dilemma.216
In March of 1981, Mario and Elsa Rios, an infertile couple from Califor-
nia, entered the Queen Victoria Medical Center's IVF program in Australia.
During the process, three eggs were removed from Mrs. Rios and fertil-
ized.217 Of the three fertilized eggs, one was transferred and the remaining
two were frozen. The one implanted embryo, however, did not result in
pregnancy. Tragically, Mr. and Mrs. Rios died in a plane crash leaving the
remaining two embryos frozen in Australia. The Rioses died without having
executed a will or an embryo disposition agreement. Immediately, legal and
ethical issues surfaced. Among them were questions regarding whether the
embryos could be discarded, transferred to another couple, considered heirs
and eligible to inherit part of the Rioses' estate through intestacy law, or
considered part of the Rioses' estate itself.
In 1984, the Waller Committee issued a report making several observa-
tions and recommendations regarding the IVF process.218 The report in-
cluded suggestions that (1) the IVF patients be required to give written
consent prior to their participation in the IVF process; 219 (2) IVF patients
expressly provide for the disposition of any in vitro embryos; 220 (3) the em-
214. See ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMMISSION, MINISTRY OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
REPORT ON HUMAN ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTION AND RELATED MATTERS 2 (1985) (Survey
of IVF programs in countries including Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, and United
States).
215. The Waller Committee was named after its chairman, Professor Louis Waller. The
Waller Committee's members included experts from the fields of law, religion, and science.
216. See Fabricant, supra note 20, at 183. '
217. Because Mr. Rios was infertile, the eggs were fertilized with the sperm of an anony-
mous donor.
218. See COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER THE SOCIAL, ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES ARISING
FROM IN VITRO FERTILIZATION, REPORT ON THE DISPOSITION OF EMBRYOS PRODUCED BY
IN VITRO FERTILIZATION (1984) [hereinafter WALLER COMMITTEE REPORT].
219. Id. § 2.7.
220. Id. §§ 2.16-.17. The couple's choices are not limited. They may discard the embryos,
donate them to another couple, or donate them for research. Id.
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bryos be thawed and discarded if, in the absence of an express agreement
regarding the disposition of the embryos, the embryos cannot be transferred
as originally intended; 221 and (4) in vitro embryos be given no independent
rights or claims to inheritance. 222 Further, the Waller Committee suggested
that embryos should not be created for research purposes only223 and that
the in vitro embryo should not be allowed to develop beyond fourteen days
after fertilization without being transferred. 224
The Waller Committee Report resulted in the passage of the Infertility
(Medical Procedures) Act.225 The Act, which took effect in 1988, is the first
worldwide attempt to regulate IVF and embryo experimentation. 226 In
scope, the Act addresses issues such as medical procedures, facility approval,
counseling requirements, consent requirements, disclosure requirements,
and record keeping.227
While adopting many of the Waller Committee's recommendations, the
Victoria Parliament rejected the suggestion that embryos should be dis-
carded in the event that implantation is not possible. Instead, the Act re-
quires that the embryos be made available to another couple. 228
B. THE UNITED KINGDOM
At approximately the same time that the Waller Committee was estab-
lished, the United Kingdom established the Department of Health and So-
cial Security Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilization and
Embryology (Warnock Committee). Similar to the Waller Committee, 229
the Warnock Committee was created to consider the social, ethical, and legal
implications of non-coital reproduction. Two years after its formation, on
June 26, 1984, the Warnock Committee issued its report to the British
Parliament.230
The comprehensive Warnock Committee Report made sixty-three recom-
mendations, which were divided into five categories: "a proposed licensing
body and its functions; principles of provision; service provisions; legal limits
on research; and legal changes."' 231 The Warnock Committee Report and
the Waller Committee Report are in agreement in several areas. For in-
stance, both reports recommend requiring IVF patient counseling before
221. Id. § 2.18.
222. Id. § 2.19.
223. Id. § 3.27.
224. Id. § 3.29.
225. Act No. 10,163, §§ 10-18 (Vict., Austl. 1984).
226. Id.; see Patricia King, Reproductive Technologies, 1 BIOLAW 113, 132 (1988).
227. King, supra note 226, at 132.
228. WALLER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 220, § 14; see also Tamara Davis, Com-
ment, Protecting the Cryopreserved Embryo, 57 TENN. L. REV. 507, 519 (1990) ("The practical
effect of this legislation is that 'extra' embryos are required to be placed in a pool with other
frozen embryos and anonymously selected for implantation.").
229. See supra notes 217-30 and accompanying text.
230. WARNOCK COMMITrEE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO HUMAN
FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYOLOGY (1984) [hereinafter WARNOCK COMMITTEE REPORT].
231. King, supra note 226, at 130; see id. for a detailed discussion of proposal and changes.
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participating in the IVF process, requiring informed consent, and limiting
the in vitro embryo's development to fourteen days after fertilization.
The Warnock Committee Report differs from the Waller Committee Re-
port, however, in two areas. One is on the issue of embryo disposition in the
absence of an expressed agreement, when implantation is not possible. In-
stead of discarding the embryos as the Waller Committee recommends, the
Warnock Committee suggests that the IVF clinic or storage facility should
acquire the rights to decide whether to dispose or to use the embryos. 232
Further, the Warnock Committee approaches embryo research differently.
In its report, the Warnock Committee suggests that embryos could be cre-
ated for research purposes, so long as their development did not exceed the
fourteen day limitation mentioned above.233
The Warnock Committee Report has been influential in the passage of
two legislative acts in the United Kingdom. The first is the Surrogacy Ar-
rangements Act passed in July of 1985.234 This Act addresses the possibility
of commercialism in surrogacy agreements. 235 In short, the Act prevents
intermediaries from profiting from surrogacy contracts but does not prevent
individuals from entering into this type of agreement.
The Human Fertilization and Embryology Bill of 1990 is the other, more
recent Act that incorporated many of the Warnock Committee's recommen-
dations. The Act's primary purpose is to permit research on in vitro em-
bryos during the first fourteen days of development following fertilization.
236
Additionally, the Bill establishes a statutory body that is responsible for the
licensing and monitoring of IVF programs. 237
Thus, both Australia and the United Kingdom have attempted to resolve
IVF ethical and legal issues by first establishing a committee that is responsi-
ble for research and evaluation of the process. Upon completion, the com-
mittee presents a final report to the legislative body who considers this report
and others in deciding the appropriate means of regulation.
V. CONCLUSION
The problem of legal uncertainty that currently plagues IVF participants
in the United States, if ignored, will only grow worse. As the number of
infertile couples enrolling in IVF programs increases, so does the likelihood
that death, divorce, or dispute will create an in vitro embryo disposition
disagreement. Many of these disputes, of course, will be resolved through
litigation.
In the absence of specific regulation and legislation regarding IVF pro-
grams, the judiciary is unable to provide comprehensive, fair, and efficient
232. WARNOCK COMMITTEE REPORT §§ 10.11-.15.
233. WARNOCK, A QUESTION OF LIFE, THE WARNOCK REPORT ON HUMAN FERTILIZA-
TION AND EMBRYOLOGY 69 (1985).
234. See King, supra note 226, at 131.
235. See discussion of In re Baby M, supra notes 203-05 and accompanying text.




resolutions to embryo disputes. Primarily, there is the problem of judicial
subjectivity that Davis illustrated. 238 Currently, as seen in Davis, the out-
come of a particular case may depend on the presiding judge's personal opin-
ion regarding the beginning of life. This problem is not mitigated by the
American Fertility Society's recommendations and suggestions for resolving
ethical issues that result from IVF. As Judge Young stated in the trial court
opinion of Davis, "[t]he Court finds and concludes that the guidelines of the
[American Fertility Society] do not serve as authority for this Court in mak-
ing a determination of whether the seven human embryos in question are
human beings. '239
The potential for judicial subjectivity is especially troublesome where the
parties have entered into an embryo disposition agreement. For instance,
where a court adopts the embryo-as-life theory,24° it may specifically negate
the parties' intent to discard in vitro embryos upon the occurrence of a speci-
fied event. Clearly, this frustrates the intent and expectations of the parties
to the agreement.
Judicial enforcement of embryo disposition agreements in the absence of
legislation, however, falls short of providing the certainty needed in the IVF
context. Issues concerning the possibility of modification, adhesion, validity,
and contractual formation by conduct would be decided jurisdiction by juris-
diction, and even then on an ad hoc basis. Aside from being an inefficient
solution, judicial enforcement of embryo disposition agreements also fails to
provide a comprehensive approach to the problem.
Thus, it is time for the United States to follow the lead of both Australia
and the United Kingdom in providing comprehensive legislation and regula-
tion of IVF programs and participants. This legislation should specifically
define the rights and liabilities associated with IVF. Additionally, the legis-
lation should determine: (1) the allowable methods of embryo disposition;
(2) what parties have the right to determine the disposition; (3) the require-
ments necessary to make a valid disposition agreement; and (4) what type of
consent is required to participate in the process and how that consent is to be
made. Until this type of legislation is passed, and a coherent, comprehensive
policy regarding IVF is established, infertile couples, doctors, and clinics
will have to continue seeking legal certainty from a judiciary that is cur-
rently unable to handle these issues effectively.
238. See supra notes 90-147 and accompanying text.
239. Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *20 (Cir. Ct. Sept. 21,
1989), rev'd, No. 180, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642. (Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990), aff'd on other
grounds, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1259 (1993).





CRYOPRESERVATION OF FERTILIZED EGGS (PRE-EMBRYOS)
TO THE PATIENT:
PLEASE TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK WITH YOUR
HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS AND REQUEST INFORMATION ON
YOUR CONDITION, THE RECOMMENDED TESTING AND PRO-
CEDURES, ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURES, AND THE RISKS AND
BENEFITS OF THE PROPOSED CRYOPRESERVATION OF FERTIL-
IZED EGGS (PRE-EMBRYOS) FOR TREATMENT OF INFERTIL-
ITY. BY FRANK AND OPEN DISCUSSION WITH YOUR HEALTH
CARE PROVIDERS, YOU WILL BE AFFORDED THE OPPORTU-
NITY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS
CONCERNING YOUR TREATMENT.
We, (husband and wife) the undersigned, un-
derstand that as a result of our participation in the ABC Hospital Assisted
Reproductive Technology Services (ARTS) In-Vitro Fertilization/Embryo
Transfer (IVF/ET) or Tubal Embryo Transfer (TET) program, more fertil-
ized eggs (pre-embryos) may form than our physician(s) recommend be
transferred in the IVF/ET or TET cycle. We wish these pre-embryos to be
frozen (cryopreserved) so that they may be transferred to the wife's uterus in
a later cycle for the purpose of establishing pregnancy. Freezing of pre-em-
bryos may occur just following fertilization at the pronuclear stage, or at
later multiple-cell stages.
RISK OF LOSS IN FREEZING AND THAWING
We understand that there is no guarantee that pre-embryos will survive
the freeze/thaw process, nor that a pregnancy will occur with pre-embryos
that have been frozen and thawed. We also understand that mechanical fail-
ure or human error can occur at any point in the process which would result
in loss of pre-embryos. We accept the risk of mechanical failure and human
error and release ABC Hospital, ARTS and our physician(s) from liability
for any loss of pre-embryos due to mechanical failure or non-negligent
human error.
JOINT DISPOSITION
We understand that the pre-embryos are subject to our joint disposition as
limited by the conditions stated below in this form, and that all decisions
about their disposition, within those limits may be affected by applicable law
or by court decision. We understand that we can jointly change the direc-
tions for future disposition contained in this form at any time by signing a




PLACEMENT OF THAWED EMBRYOS
We understand that when we are ready to have cryopreserved pre-em-
bryos thawed for the purpose of establishing pregnancy, one or more of the
cryopreserved pre-embryos may be thawed and placed in the wife's uterus
for that purpose. Only thawed pre-embryos considered to be potentially via-
ble, as determined by the ARTS' embryologist(s), will be transferred to the
uterus for that purpose.
MONITORING OF WIFE'S CYCLE
Frozen pre-embryos will be thawed and placed in the wife's uterus only if
our physician(s) determine that the cycle is adequate to receive thawed pre-
embryos. This determination requires careful monitoring of the wife's cycle.
We understand that this monitoring will require several blood tests and/or
other medically indicated examinations/treatments. The cost of this moni-
toring is in addition to the other costs incurred for freezing, storing, and
thawing of our pre-embryos.
INABILITY TO TRANSFER PRE-EMBRYOS
We understand that in freezing pre-embryos, it is the intent of all parties
to enable those pre-embryos to be placed in the wife's uterus in later cycles.
However, there may be future circumstances that make us unable or unwill-
ing to undergo such placement, or that make it impossible or medically inad-
visable for our physician(s) to proceed with such placement. We understand
that the ARTS physician is not obligated to proceed with transfer, if on the
basis of reasonable' medical judgment or new scientific evidence, it is con-
cluded that the risks of transfer outweigh the benefits.
DISCARD OF EMBRYOS ONLY AS LAST RESORT
We understand that ARTS does not intend to thaw without transfer to the
uterus or otherwise discard potentially viable frozen pre-embryos. We un-
derstand that any frozen pre-embryos that are not or cannot be placed in the
wife's uterus will be donated to another ARTS program for the purpose of
transfer to the uterus of infertile women seeking pre-embryo donations.
ARTS will make reasonable and diligent efforts to locate such programs.
Barring an emergency or other unforeseen circumstance that makes dona-
tion impossible, ARTS intends to donate frozen pre-embryos that we no
longer wish to be placed or that cannot be placed in the wife's uterus to an
ARTS Program that has a reasonable possibility of donating them to infer-
tile women. If after diligent efforts no programs willing to accept frozen pre-
embryos for transfer to women seeking pre-embryo donations can be found,
the ARTS program, as a last resort, may discard potentially viable frozen
pre-embryos.
DISCARD UNDER OTHER PROGRAMS
We understand that other ARTS Programs exist in Texas and other states
that do offer discard as a dispositional alternative for pre-embryos that can-
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not be placed in the wife's uterus. We understand that we seek treatment at
those programs if we desire such a dispositional option.
DISPOSITION TO OTHERS
We understand that this form is an agreement between ourselves, ABC
Hospital, Assisted Reproductive Technology Services and physician(s) treat-
ing us concerning disposition of our frozen pre-embryos if the following
events occur:
1. In the event of death of husband, we wish the frozen pre-embryos
to be:
preserved for disposition by the wife
(initials)
donated for transfer to infertile women
(initials)
2. In the event of the death of the wife, we wish the frozen pre-em-
bryos to be:
preserved for disposition by the husband
(initials)
donated for transfer to infertile women
(initials)
3. In the event of both of our deaths, we understand that frozen pre-
embryos will be donated for transfer to infertile women.
(initials)
4. In the event of our divorce, we wish any frozen pre-embryos to be:
donated for transfer to infertile women
(initials)
placed at the disposal of the wife or the
husband.
(initials)
DIVORCE OR DEATH OF SPOUSE
In the event of divorce or the death of either spouse, the spouse given
dispositional authority over frozen pre-embryos by this agreement shall have
the same dispositional rights that we have under this agreement, including
the right to withdraw from the ARTS Program as stated below. These dis-
positional rights are subject to all guidelines of ARTS, which at the present
time do not permit placement of pre-embryos in a woman who is not
married.
STORAGE OF PRE-EMBRYOS UNTIL WIFE'S AGE 50
We understand that we may store our frozen pre-embryos for a period of
time not to exceed the normal reproductive life of the wife or her reaching
age 50 if we so instruct ARTS. We understand that at that time, all frozen
pre-embryos will be donated for transfer to infertile women. To assure con-
tinued storage of our frozen pre-embryos, we must inform ARTS in writing
of our desire to continue storage at least once every three years. ARTS
reserves the right to donate frozen pre-embryos if we have not requested
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further storage in writing for three years since such instructions have been
received by the Program.
VOLUNTARY RELINQUISHMENT; WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PROGRAM;
TRANSFER
We understand that at any time that we have frozen pre-embryos stored at
ABC Hospital ARTS, we may, by a signed and notarized written statement,
relinquish any or all of those frozen pre-embryos for donation to infertile
women. We also understand that we have the right at any time to withdraw
from ABC Hospital ARTS and remove our frozen pre-embryos to another
ARTS Program or storage facility of our choice. We understand that in the
event of withdrawal and transfer of pre-embryos to another facility, we as-
sume the risk of any loss of pre-embryos that may occur in the process of
transfer or in the subsequent storage and handling of our frozen pre-em-
bryos, including any reduction in the chance of successfully establishing
pregnancy with them. We hereby release ABC Hospital, ARTS and our
physician(s) from any liability or damages for transfer of frozen pre-embryos
to another facility after our withdrawal from the ABC Hospital ARTS
Program.
TERMINATION OF ARTS PROGRAM
We understand that ABC Hospital ARTS reserves the right to terminate
its participation in cryopreservation of pre-embryos. In this event, all rea-
sonable efforts will be made to arrange transfer of frozen pre-embryos to an
ARTS program or storage facility that is acceptable to us. In the absence of
directions from us concerning transfer of our frozen pre-embryos to another
ARTS program or storage facility, the ARTS program will select another
ARTS program or storage facility for continued storage of our pre-embryos.
ARTS will pay the expenses that arise from transfer to and storage at an-
other program or storage facility for up to one year. We understand that we
will then be responsible for contracting with the new program or facility for
further storage of our pre-embryos, and will be subject to any limitations
which that program or facility places on storage of pre-embryos, including
discard or donation of pre-embryos for nonpayment of storage fees.
ANONYMOUS DONATION
We understand that donation of frozen pre-embryos in accordance with
this agreement will be made anonymously. We understand that we will not
be informed of the identity of the recipient of such donations, or whether
any children are born as a result. We forever relinquish any claim to or
jurisdiction over any offspring that might result from donation of our pre-
embryos, subject to any requirements of obligations imposed by applicable
law to pre-embryos donations. We understand that ARTS will not charge us
for any costs associated with or arising from donation of our frozen pre-
embryos for transfer to infertile women.
Unless required by court order, we understand that our identities will not
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be disclosed to any ARTS program or woman who receives donation of our
frozen pre-embryos or disclosed to any other person. However, we agree
that before donating frozen pre-embryos, we will each fill out a questionnaire
on our physical characteristics, education, and personal and family health
history, for use by ARTS in making such donations. Except by court order,
no program or woman receiving a donation of our frozen pre-embryos will
have access to our identities or to the actual completed questionnaires, but
they may receive non-identifiable information disclosed in the questionnaire
to help them make a decision concerning receipt of our frozen pre-embryos.
BLOOD SCREENING
We understand that we will have to undergo tests of our blood or body
tissue to screen for transmittable disease both before ARTS treatment and 6-
8 months following freezing of pre-embryos. We agree to take these tests
and understand that we will bear the costs of the screening procedures.
RISK OF ABNORMALITIES
We understand that extensive animal data and limited human studies do
not reasonably indicate at the present time that children born as the result of
freeze/thaw of IVF-created pre-embryos experience a high rate of abnormal-
ities due to IVF/ET or due to the freeze/thaw process. However, we under-
stand that until very large numbers of children have been born following
freezing/thawing of pre-embryos, it is not possible to be sure whether the
rate of abnormalities is different from the normal rate. Amniocentesis or
other prenatal tests may detect some but not most abnormalities that affect
children. We accept these risks and acknowledge that any abnormality of a
child born after freezing/thawing of pre-embryos is not the responsibility of
ARTS.
CHARGES
We understand that the pre-embryo freezing and thawing process is intri-
cate and time-consuming and that we are responsible for all related expenses.
We agree to advise ARTS of any change of address within three months of
such change.
(Signature of Wife)
(Signature of Husband)
(Signature of Witness)
(Date)
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